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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Gordon pleaded guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen
and a repeat offender enhancement. The district court imposed a sentence of life, with 40 years
fixed. It also ordered Mr. Gordon to pay $29,222.95 in restitution. On appeal, Mr. Gordon
asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay restitution and when it
imposed an excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2017, police officers were told that a 15-year-old had given birth to a
child, and Mr. Gordon was the father.

(Presentence Report Volume II (PSI Vol. II, p.2.) 1

Mr. Gordon initially denied the accusations, but after DNA testing, he was arrested in January of
2018. (PSI Vol. II, p.3.) Subsequently, he was charged with one count oflewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen. (R., pp.30-31.) The State also filed an Information Part II alleging that he
was a repeat offender. (R., pp.33-34.) Mr. Gordon pled guilty to both charges. (Tr., p.7, L.5 p.15, L.16.)
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor requested that the district court impose a
sentence of life, with a minimum of 30 years fixed. (Tr., p.30, Ls.16-22.) She also requested
that the district court order Mr. Gordon to pay $29,222.95 in restitution. (Tr., p.20, Ls.2-24.)
She stated that $1,500 of that amount was for DNA lab testing; $536 was for services provided

1

All citations to the PSI Vol. II refer to the 437-page electronic document. All citations to the
PSI Vol. I refer to the 436-page electronic document.
1

by the Medicaid CARES 2 program, and $27,186.95 was to reimburse Medicaid for the expenses
associated with the pregnancy and birth. (Tr., p.20, Ls.8-14.)
Mr. Gordon's defense counsel requested that the district court impose a fixed sentence of
15 years and left the indeterminate portion of the sentence to the court's discretion. (Tr., p.37,
Ls.19-20.)

He also asked that the district court not order restitution due to Mr. Gordon's

inability to pay. (Tr., p.38, Ls.3-22.) The district court imposed a sentence of life, with 40 years
fixed. 3 (R., pp.96-99; Tr., p.46, Ls.3-9.) Pursuant to LC. § 19-5304, it also ordered Mr. Gordon
to pay the full amount ofrestitution the State requested. (R., pp.93-94, 98; Tr., p.46, Ls.17-18.)
Mr. Gordon then filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.101-02.)

2

Children at Risk Evaluation Services
The judgment of conviction contains what appears to be a typographical error. The Information
Part II alleged that Mr. Gordon was a repeat sexual offender pursuant to LC. § 19-25200.
(R., pp.33-34.) However, the judgment of conviction indicated that the enhancement was
pursuant to LC. § 37-2739. (R., pp.96-97.) The district court stated at the sentencing hearing
that the two statutes contained similar language (Tr., p.40, L.15 - p.41, L.18) and apparently
mistakenly inserted the latter statute in its judgment of conviction.
3

2

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Gordon to pay restitution
based only on the State's verbal request at the sentencing hearing?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of life, with 40
years fixed, following Mr. Gordon's pleas of guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen and a repeat offender enhancement?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Gordon To Pay Restitution Based
Only On The State's Verbal Request At The Sentencing Hearing
The district court abused its discretion when it ordered Mr. Gordon to pay restitution
because its restitution award was not supported by substantial evidence as required by I. C. § 195304. 4

Rather, it was based only on the prosecutor's argument at the sentencing hearing

regarding the amount and breakdown of the restitution claim.
"The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of
a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in LC. § 19-5304(7) and by the
policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Smith,
144 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). An appellate court conducts a multitiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial
court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

"The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court
whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence." Smith, 144 Idaho at
692 (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho 645, 650 (2014) (citations

4

The State's restitution claim was not challenged on this basis at the sentencing hearing.
However, "[a]n appellate challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to meet a party's burden of
proof requires no specific action or argument below. State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873
(Ct. App. 2007).
4

omitted).

The economic loss of the victim "shall be based upon the preponderance of the

evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator."
I.C. § 19-5304(6). Thus, the statute requires that the PSI include "a full statement of economic
loss suffered by the victim or victims of the defendant's crime or crimes." LC. § 19-5304(12).
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor reviewed the fact that the parties had agreed to
"open recommendations" regarding the sentence. (Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.1.) She then stated,
"We do have a restitution claim in this case. It's quite significant. It's $29,222.95." (Tr., p.20,
Ls.2-3.) The district court then asked the prosecutor to repeat that number. (Tr., p.20, Ls.4-5.)
She repeated the number and then explained the breakdown of the claim, which included one
request for DNA lab testing and two requests for Medicaid: one for $536, and one for
$27,186.95. (Tr., p.20, Ls.8-14.)
Subsequently-after the parties made their respective sentencing recommendations-the
district court stated it would order restitution in the amount the prosecutor had just requested.
(Tr., p.46, Ls.17-18.) Thus, it appears that the district court relied only on the prosecutor's
verbal request and breakdown of the amounts without reviewing the PSI to confirm that those
amounts were supported by statements of economic loss, which would constitute substantial
evidence. And the only statement of economic loss contained in the PSI was the Idaho State
Police DNA Restitution request for $1,500. (PSI Vol. I, p.27.) The PSI contained no statements
of economic loss to support the State's restitution requests for Medicaid costs.
As such, because the restitution award was not supported by substantial evidence, the
district court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to its choices, and it did
not reach its decision regarding restitution through an exercise of reason. Therefore, it abused its
discretion.

5

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Life, With 40 Years
Fixed, Following Mr. Gordon's Pleas Of Guilty To Lewd Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen
And A Repeat Offender Enhancement
Based on the facts of this case, Mr. Gordon's sentence of life, with 40 years fixed, is
excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When there is a claim
that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct "an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In
such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion
is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court "( 1) correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its
decision by the exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
"When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Gordon's sentence is excessive under
any reasonable view of the facts. First, Mr. Gordon expressed remorse for his conduct in this

6

case. At the sentencing hearing, he stated, "Mainly I'd like to apologize to the victim, the
victim's family, my family. Of course to society, to everybody here at the courts." (Tr., p.39,
Ls.4-6.) He went on to say he understood that what he did was a "horrible, horrible thing."
(Tr., p.39, Ls.7-8.) After acknowledging he had hurt the victim, her family, and his family, he
said, "And I would just, again, like to apologize to everybody involved." (Tr., p.39, Ls.15-21.)
A defendant's expression of remorse is a long-recognized mitigating factor. State v. Shideler,
103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, "expressed regret for
what he had done, especially for the effect it had upon his family and friends, but also indicated
that he was confident he could be a productive citizen in the future").
Additionally, Mr. Gordon has a positive work history.

Indeed, at the time of these

charges, he had had been working as a mechanic for over four years, and he had a good salary.
(PSI Vol. II, pp.12-13.) The manager where he worked stated that he had not met Mr. Gordon
personally but had heard from colleagues that Mr. Gordon was very good at his job. (PSI Vol. II,
p.13.) A defendant's positive work history and employability are also established mitigating
factors. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90-91 (1982) (highlighting the fact that the defendant was a
skilled mechanic who was employed as a truck driver at the time of his sentencing, then going on
to reduce the defendant's sentence, in part, because he "was working and helping to support his
children at the time of the conviction").
Given the mitigating factors in this case, Mr. Gordon's sentence was excessive because it
was not necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. The district court failed to adequately
consider these mitigating factors and thus failed to reach its sentencing decision through an
exercise of reason. As such it abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Gordon's extended
sentence.

7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gordon respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.

Additionally, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of

restitution and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 23 rd day of May, 2019.

I sf Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 rd day of May, 2019, I caused a true and correct
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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